



The Case for Change at Workspace Group Plc

Presentation by Saba Capital Management, L.P.

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Executive Summary

The Case for Change

Workspace Group Plc (“Workspace” or the “Company”) owns a portfolio of valuable real estate assets that are significantly undervalued by the market. This reflects the Board’s embrace of a failed strategy and misallocation of capital that has led to persistent shareholder value destruction. The evidence is clear:

1. 48% decline in TSR over the last five years¹
 2. 50% discount to NAV, ranking last compared to 19 other UK REITs¹
 3. c.80% occupancy, well below comparable peers
-

Shareholders are asked to believe that further reinvestment offers a better use of capital than repurchasing deeply discounted shares. After years of underperformance, investors can judge those claims against the Company's track record.

We believe that Workspace’s assets are materially undervalued by the market. Selling properties will crystallise value, with proceeds used to repurchase deeply discounted shares, offering a more certain and lower-risk path to creating shareholder value.

Executive Summary (cont'd)

Situation Overview

- Workspace has a portfolio of valuable real estate assets that are significantly undervalued by the market
- Management's projected earnings decline is likely to negatively impact portfolio property values further
- Workspace disposed of 13 properties (£126m) from Apr. '25 – Mar. '26 at a 7.2% average discount to book value. More recent sales highlighted by Workspace include only three properties that are outliers and are not representative of the broader portfolio¹
- This affirms that private buyers ascribe a substantially higher value to the Company's properties than the market price of the Company's publicly traded shares
- Workspace's historical CapEx and refurbishment efforts have yielded poor returns. The Company's new targets are unrealistic: around 8x higher yield on cost than historical performance with no basis for this significant improvement²

Executive Summary (cont'd)

Value Creation Strategy

- Saba's plan pairs a Managed Wind-Down with a Value Creation Strategy that provides optionality that is not constrained by any deadline
- As part of the Value Creation Strategy, Workspace should accelerate the disposition of properties to crystallise their value
- With sales proceeds, Workspace should repurchase shares to increase NAV/share and close the discount to NAV
- We have engaged with leading property managers who validated our thesis that Workspace could drive revenue growth and reduce costs by outsourcing property management, while also optimising its refurbishment process
- Improving properties with the potential for higher occupancy and higher rental rates will increase Workspace's optionality through the proposed disposition process
- It is irresponsible for the Workspace Board of Directors to continue to pursue an unproven and value destructive strategy when it can pursue an asset disposition and capital return strategy that generates a far superior return for all investors with significantly less risk

Executive Summary (cont'd)

The Mandate for Board Changes

- New non-executive directors are necessary to reset the strategy and execute the Value Creation Strategy
- Incumbent non-executive directors have overseen Workspace's persistent underperformance and poor strategy
- Incumbent non-executive directors have demonstrated they do not have the qualifications or capacity to effectively oversee the Company
- Saba has nominated six highly qualified independent executives and real estate experts to replace them and join the Board as non-executive directors

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About Saba Capital

Saba Capital is a \$6 billion global alternative asset management firm founded in 2009 by Boaz Weinstein that identifies dislocations in the credit and equity markets and aims to deliver convex returns, particularly in volatile markets



Saba's Engagement at Closed End Funds

- Saba has a superb track record of investing in and driving value creation at closed end funds (CEFs)
- At CEFs, Saba's investment strategy focuses on:
 - Pursuing strategic actions that return discounted companies to their full NAV
 - Creating long-term value for shareholders
 - Protecting shareholder rights

Saba is leveraging its experience at CEFs to pursue analogous campaigns at REITs and other similar asset classes




Extending Saba's Engagement to REITs

- REITs typically include identifiable assets where market prices diverge from NAV
- Discount can be closed through asset sales, share repurchases, and enhanced corporate governance, in addition to operational improvements
- Saba is a pioneer in investing in complex capital structures endemic to REITs

Saba's Strategy Consistently Delivers Value to Shareholders


Saba has a strong track record of creating value for shareholders



Saba's Engagement at CEFs Has Driven Outperformance

Saba has created a durable advantage and outperformance through its activism at CEFs

Growth of £100 - Total Return (Indexed to 100 as of Jun. 2021)¹



+67 ppt outperformance


Saba's CEF ETF has outperformed
comparable market products

Periodic Total Returns			
Year	CEFS	PCEF	Outperformance
2021 (Jun–Dec)	5.9%	4.0%	+1.8%
2022	4.6%	-8.4%	+13.0%
2023	14.2%	3.3%	+11.0%
2024	25.7%	18.8%	+6.9%
2025	8.6%	4.8%	+3.8%
2026 (Jan - May)	13.7%	5.2%	+8.5%

How We Got Here: Saba's Engagement with Workspace

Saba has constructively engaged with the Workspace Board and management on multiple occasions, and ultimately determined that new non-executive directors are necessary

Saba is the second largest shareholder in Workspace (c. 27.1% | 52.2m shares)¹



Our value creation thesis has evolved while our conviction in the need for change at Workspace has grown

About Workspace

Workspace has a concentrated portfolio of core assets around London

Active Sites

56

Unique locations across 8 markets¹

Total Floor Area

3.8m

Net lettable sq ft

Net Rent Roll²

£127.3m

Annualised


Lettable Offerings

Three types of office space:

- Unfurnished office space
- Fully furnished turnkey office space
- “WeWork” -style small co-working suites with shared amenities

Rent Roll by Market

Sub-market distribution of annualised net rent (£m)



Portfolio Composition

By asset classification



STABILISED
38 sites

2.9m SF · £108.3m rent · 75% of portfolio



REFURBISHMENTS
8 sites

0.6m SF · £11.4m rent · 16% of portfolio



SOUTHEAST OFFICE
8 sites

0.3m SF · £6.9m rent · 9% of portfolio




NON-CORE
2 sites

<0.1m SF · £0.8m rent · <1% of portfolio

Workspace Property Map

Portfolio comprises 56 unique locations, with assets concentrated in Greater London and 10 properties outside of London

Portfolio by Region		# of Properties
	South East London	12
	Stabilised	9
	Refurbishment	3
	A Bit Further Out	10
	Southeast Office	8
	Non-core	2
	West London	8
	Stabilised	
	East London	7
	Stabilised	
	North London	6
	Stabilised	3
	Refurbishment	3
	Central London	7
	Stabilised	
	South West London	3
	Stabilised	2
	Refurbishment	1
	City of London	3
	Stabilised	2
	Refurbishment	1
Total Portfolio		56



Variance in Asset Quality Reflects Poor Capital Allocation Decisions

Declining scale, rent roll pressure and suboptimal occupancy levels highlight challenges despite recent operational improvements

Portfolio Headwinds



Asset Positioning

Portfolio skewed towards non-prime, creative / fringe London sub-markets (vs. city centre office)



Product Strategy

Emphasis on converted industrial + flexible, modular workspace differentiates from traditional office peers



Tenant Mix Risk

Heavy exposure to startups / SMEs with short-term leases leading to higher churn vs. institutional tenants



Demand Sensitivity

Leasing tied to SME / tech sector health, increasing cyclical vs. diversified office demand



Operational Model

High customer count (~4,000 tenants) supports diversification but increases leasing intensity and volatility

Sell-Side Analysts Validate the Portfolio Hypothesis...



"Execution risk remains high, valuation unattractive, and we prefer exposure to IWG for flex and BLND, LAND and DLN for traditional London offices"

10 June 2026



Deutsche Bank

"New management team works to reposition the portfolio [...] outlook for WKP remains challenging [...] recovery expected to take (even more) time"

17 April 2026

BANK OF AMERICA 


"Occupancy at 20-year low [...] fell [...] to 75.4%, the lowest since 2006"

19 November 2025


Deep and Persistent Discount to NAV

The discount to NAV reflects the market's indictment of the Board's chronic destruction of value over a sustained period of time

UK REITs P/NAV Discounts



UK REITs P/NAV History




Workspace can create significant value for shareholders (~50% return) simply by moving from worst-in-class to the peer average

History of Value Destruction Reflected in TSR Performance

Workspace's stock price has underperformed in absolute terms and relative to peers

Chronic TSR Underperformance¹



Persistent TSR underperformance, driven by price depreciation that not even a healthy dividend yield can help counteract

Disguising Underperformance with Irrelevant Peer Comparisons

There is no hiding the fact that the Board has overseen years of share price declines

Workspace Presentation 1 Jul. 2026



- IWG: International flex office provider with a leasehold business model, as opposed to Workspace's freehold business model
- British Land and Landsec are both large, diversified REITs and therefore are not comparable to Workspace

	Workspace	London office peers - most comparable peer set			Operational peers				Other		
		GPE	Derwent	Helical	Grainger	Safestore	Big Yellow Group	Unite Group	British Land	Landsec	IWG
Key peers	-	London office	London office	London office	Operational	Operational	Operational	Operational	-	-	-
Market cap (£m)	662	1,323	2,121	237	1,229	1,320	1,693	2,729	4,298	4,910	1,754
Net tangible assets (£m) ²	1,328	2,127	3,620	430	2,154	2,447	2,599	4,685	5,923	6,574	n/a
Sector	Office	Office	Office	Office	Residential	Self storage	Self storage	PBSA	Diversified	Diversified	Office

Source: FactSet as of 15 June 2026
Notes: ¹ FY26, by portfolio value incl. joint ventures. ² Saba peer set per slide 14 of their document comprised of GPE, Derwent, British Land, and Landsec.

- ✗ Workspace is redefining its “peers” to distract from its underperformance
- ✗ Workspace acknowledges that the “Operational Peers” are in different sectors and sizes
- ✗ Helical is much smaller than Workspace and not a peer


Even Compared to Workspace's Self-Selected Relevant London Office Peers, It Has Underperformed¹



The Board has overseen chronic and persistent shareholder value destruction, no matter how the data is sliced. Instead of taking accountability, the Board is attempting to distort their underperformance

Workspace's Focus on EV / GAV is a Misguided Misdirection

Equity investors focus on the Price / NAV discount, not EV / GAV




- Even when using Workspace's misleading EV / GAV metric, the Company's discount is the worst among London office peers
- Focusing on EV / GAV understates the Price / NAV discount
- The presentation of these discounts as positive figures seems to misrepresent Workspace's larger number as a beneficial factor when it is not


Is Workspace trying to mislead shareholders on the extent of its underperformance?

Chronically Low Occupancy Due to Poor Operational Execution

Massive gap in occupancy levels relative to peers undermines Board credibility that operations have stabilised



Workspace's Occupancy Exhibits a Consistent Double-Digit Delta to Relevant Peers¹




Workspace's occupancy continues to be on a downward trend,
deteriorating 5 ppts since Q1 24/25

- Workspace's portfolio occupancy consistently trails DLN and GPE
- The Board has failed to address occupancy decline and instead characterises it as "stabilised"

Amid occupancy attrition and underperformance Workspace's Board claims that they know the customer best

Sell-Side Confidence Has Steadily Eroded

The stock has de-rated and the sell-side remains cautious on the outlook for WKP stock



Negative Outlook Reiterated Since Spring 2026



"The FY26 result was not the issue; the issue is the earnings reset that we expect to follow. Our new numbers imply lower EPS through FY30E versus prior forecasts, a dividend rebasing, and a valuation that we do not find compelling [...] **we do not forecast the group getting to its £125m recurring EBIT guide over our 5-year forecast period**"

10 June 2026

J.P.Morgan CAZENOVE

"[At least five operational challenges] will combine for a c.£10-15m impact [to trading profits]...18-26% below current Bloomberg consensus"

17 April 2026



"No recovery before FY30 confirmed"

17 April 2026

Crystallise Value with Strategic Property Dispositions

Unlock embedded real estate value with dispositions and share buybacks. Operational levers provide additional upside

Key Value Creation Driver



Portfolio Review and Capital Allocation



- Sell assets to crystallise value, including the possible sale of the entire portfolio
- Repurchase shares to close the discount to NAV
- Repeat on an ongoing basis¹
- Workspace is not a forced seller and retains optionality throughout the disposition and refurbishment process

Incremental Value Creation Levers



Outsource Property Management

- Reduce costs at the corporate and property levels
- Increase occupancy to drive revenue growth and boost valuations



Strategic Refurbishment

- Reduce capital outlays by limiting refurbishment to select high-impact assets
- Target property upgrades that will increase occupancy, improve rental rates or enhance sale positioning

Oversight from a refreshed Board with new non-executive directors is necessary to oversee and execute this strategy

Sell Properties, Repurchase Shares, Close the NAV Discount

Workspace must sell assets and repurchase shares to close the discount to NAV



Recent Asset Sales Validate Our Thesis

- Workspace's recent asset sales affirm that the public equity market is undervaluing its properties, with sales at implied discounts to NAV significantly less than 50%
- This crystallises value and demonstrates buyers' appetite for the Company's properties
- The current disposition strategy is insufficient given the challenges Workspace faces and projected earnings compression



Accelerating and Augmenting Asset Sales is Imperative

- Workspace must leverage Saba's comprehensive portfolio review and accelerate this disposition process
- Repurchase shares with the proceeds, which at the present NAV discount generates ~100% return on capital: buying £1 for ~50p
- We believe this substantially exceeds the returns of Workspace's current strategy and capital allocation approach

Management is Asking for a Leap of Faith

Worsening earnings and guidance affirms our thesis that property sales and returning capital are the most effective paths to crystallising value for all shareholders

FY 2026 Figures At a Glance

£110m

(2%) decline y/y underlying net rental income

£2.1bn

(7%) decline y/y portfolio fair value (disposal adjusted)

£6.9

(11%) decline y/y net asset value per share

Guidance Underscores Imperative to Crystallise Value

- Workspace recently indicated multiple headwinds for FY2027 and beyond, noting an earnings trough is likely in FY2028
- Projected earnings decline will likely further reduce the value of the underlying properties, emphasising the importance of timely dispositions

"We continue to see merit in the direction of travel, but the plan requires simultaneous delivery on disposals, capex discipline, pricing recovery, cost control and customer conversion. That is a demanding combination in a highly competitive London flex-office market."


10 June 2026



While operating results deteriorate, the Board continues to stick with its failed strategy

Property Disposition Strategy Based on Saba's Portfolio Review

Properties categorised into three tranches to sequence sales and maximise the value of the remaining portfolio through the process



Rationale for Property Disposal Schedule




SEQUENCE AND STAGING

- Priority disposals are non-core to Workspace portfolio
- Remaining portfolio more cohesive and attractive to a potential buyer in a comprehensive sale



LOCATION

- Group assets by natural geography / sub-market
- Assets are attractive to investors with existing presence in sub-markets or those looking to diversify



STRATEGIC EXIT / BEST USE

- Assets bucketed according to exit strategy and best alternative use
- Examples include residential conversion, self-storage conversion, traditional lease, serviced offices

Property Disposition Strategy Overview

A multi-track disposition approach maximises value while preserving optionality

Market Diversification

- Portfolio spans multiple asset classes (office, flex, BTR-conversion) attracting distinct investor profiles
- Prevents market saturation by not flooding a single buyer pool
- Different use classes enable parallel concurrent marketing tracks

Targeted Buyer Engagement

- Creates competitive tension
- Preserves valuation by positioning assets as strategic opportunities
- Allows bespoke structuring: outright purchase, forward-fund, JV or option agreements

Strategic Cluster Consolidation – Illustrative Example

- **Dispose of two buildings from a four-building geographic cluster;** concentrate capital and management on strongest performers
- **Convert 60-70% occupancy across four buildings to 80-90% across two buildings:** relocate tenants and improve operating leverage
- **Concentrated investment funds lobby renovations, HVAC upgrades, amenities and technology,** creating genuine competitive differentiation
- **Proactive tenant relocation:** identify tenants in disposed buildings that benefit from moving to retained assets; offer financial incentives

Recent Workspace Disposals Indicate Buyer Depth

Workspace's disposals over the past three years reveal a range of buyer types going forward

Workspace Disposals 2023 – 2026 YTD

Recent Workspace asset disposals include a variety of buyers, indicating a strong and deep market for its properties including:

- Residential developers
- Industrial investor and developer / private equity
- Owner-occupiers
- Private investors
- Family offices



Target Buyers: 2026 and Beyond

- Workspace's recent disposals have been dominated by large sales to urban logistics and residential investors
- The residual portfolio has significantly higher weighting towards serviced offices than workshops and light industrial
- As a result, the buyer universe is likely to be broader and less dominated by industrial investors going forward:
 - **Single-Asset Basis:** Private investors, family offices and property companies are expected to represent the most active buyer groups
 - **Wholesale Portfolio Approach:** Private equity and larger family offices are the likely primary buyer constituency

Private Investors are Most Active Across the Wider London Market

Strong private capital demand and attractive alternative-use markets support liquidity for Workspace assets across relevant markets

Prospective purchasers with recently completed transactions or active investment requirements within the relevant submarkets:

Smaller Assets



Larger Assets




Alternative Use Assets



Private capital has been one of the principal purchaser groups of Workspace disposals along with residential and urban logistics developers and investors capturing higher alternative-use values

Workspace's Misleading Analysis on the London Office Market

Workspace defines the disposal market as "London office ex-West-End & City," producing a deliberately narrow view of market liquidity and understating the addressable market in several ways



Workspace Disclosure / Claim

The Reality

✗ Data excludes alternative-use volumes: residential conversion, self-storage, industrial redevelopment, BTR

- These transactions represent a material portion of buyer universe
- Workspace's own disposal history includes sales to residential and logistics developers at alternative-use values

✗ Assumes Saba needs to capture 20% of annual sub-£50m deal flow

- Phased disposals across multiple use classes, buyer types and geographies would not concentrate in a single sub-market
- Workspace's figures indicate a disposal annual run rate of £310m, based on an assumed 20% capture of the sub-£50m London office sub-market excluding the West End and City. Applying this run rate to the full UK commercial market, which captures transactions beyond this narrow sub-segment, equates to approximately 1% of average annual volumes over the past five years. This sits well within normal market absorption capacity

✗ Excludes City and West End transaction volumes

- ~25% of the portfolio sits in core London markets
- By Workspace's own data, these are the most liquid segments of the London office market, representing ~70% of total London office transaction volumes over the past five years
- This undermines Workspace's characterisation of the portfolio as trapped in an illiquid market

Recent Asset Sales Indicate Significant Upside in Saba's Plan

Workspace recently sold 13 properties at an average 7% discount to book value

Property Name	Sub-Market	Date Sold	Sale / Exchange Price (£m)
Q West in Brentford	West London	April 2025	10.3
The Shaftesbury Centre in Ladbroke Grove	West London	July 2025	4.7
Morie Street Studios in Wandsworth	South West London	August 2025	8.1
Chocolate Factory (Part) - Block E1 in Wood Green	North London		2.2
338 Goswell Road in Angel	North London	November 2025	41.7
Cannon Wharf in Surrey Quays	South East London		
The Mille in Brentford	West London		
Castle Lane in Victoria	Central London	December 2025	14.3
Blocks A and B of Parkhall Business Centre in Dulwich	South East London	December 2025 ¹	6.3 ²
Peer House in Holborn	Central London	February 2026	4.8
Havelock Terrace in Battersea	South West London	March 2026	20.0
The Planets, Woking	A Bit Further Out	March 2026	7.3
66 Wilson Street in Moorgate	City of London	March 2026 ¹	6.0
Total Value of Properties Exchanged or Completed as Sales:			125.7
Average Discount to Book Value:			(7.2%)³

Workspace recently announced it is considering £100m+ of additional disposals, validating our asset sale strategy

Recent Disposals Showcase Management's Poor Decision Making

Three recent disposals highlighted by Workspace do not represent expected discounts across the remaining portfolio. Instead, these assets represent Workspace's sub-par performance and failed capital projects

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ADM 2026

CURRENT MARKET REQUIRES SELECTIVE DECISIONS AROUND ASSET DISPOSALS

*Workspace Presentation
1 Jul. 2026*

Asset disposals since financial year end (Mar-26):


Property	Book Value (Mar-26)	Valuation Yield	Net Sale Price	Net Initial Yield	Sale Price Discount to Book Value (Mar-26)
Chiswick Studios	£3.4m	8.3%	£3.0m	8.0%	(10.5%)
Evergreen Studios	£10.5m	4.2%	£6.6m	10.5%	(36.5%)
One Crown Square	£3.8m	7.4%	£3.0m	18.7%	(20.0%)
Average of Post Close Disposals	£5.9m	6.6%	£4.2m	12.4%	(22.3%)

Combined Net Sale Price £12.6m
Combined Net Initial Yield 11.9%
Combined Discount to Book Value (Mar-26) (28.0%)

Even when including the three properties Workspace chooses to narrowly focus on, the average realised discount across all 16 properties sold since April 2025 is 10%, not 22%

These Properties Are Not Representative Of The Entire Portfolio

- Chiswick Studio's net rent roll **down over 70% since acquisition in 2022**
- Evergreen Studios just completed a refurbishment with an undisclosed amount of CapEx investment. Net rent roll **decreased nearly 20%** since acquisition in 2022
- One Crown Square's net rent roll **flat** since acquisition in 2022



Why Repurchasing Shares is Important

Recycling asset disposal proceeds into share buybacks is a critical fulcrum to creating shareholder value

- More aggressively repurchasing shares would affirm that Workspace believes its shares are undervalued because the NAV is credible
- The potential return on investment of repurchasing shares is greater than the incremental return of refurbishing properties:
 - Management stated that the incremental yield on the cost of refurbishments is 12.5-30%
 - The implied return of repurchasing shares is ~100% at a 50% discount to NAV
- Workspace has historically repurchased minimal shares to offset stock-based remuneration while other UK REITs are acting more decisively:
 - Derwent London (42% discount to NAV) recently launched a £50m repurchase programme, with shares up more than 10% since announcement¹

MONEYWEEK

“You can’t criticize [Derwent London] management for buying back stock – **it’s the equivalent of buying a new building at a 50% discount.**”

“Given the continued liquidation of the London equity market, it **could only be a matter of time before every remaining deeply discounted REIT gets taken out.**”


- “A Broken Market with a Catalyst,” 8 Jun. 2026.

At the present NAV discount, repurchasing shares generates a ~100% return on capital: buying £1 for ~50p

To Maximise Value, Assets Should be Sold

Significant upside opportunity to realise value through selling properties


Potential Upside Scenarios



(£m)	Sales Comps Valuation ¹
Estimated Property Realisation	2,400
<i>Less: Transaction costs (5%)</i>	(120)
<i>Less: Assumed Discount: (5% to 20%)</i>	(120 - 480)
<i>Less: Net Debt</i>	(758)
Implied Net Proceeds/Equity Value	1,042 - 1,402
Implied Price/Share at Assumed Discount of:	
5%	£7.26
7%	£7.01
10%	£6.64
15%	£6.01
20%	£5.39
Implied Upside	57% - 111%

Dedicated Property Manager to Reduce Costs and Increase Value

A dedicated property manager would create clear accountability for occupancy, tenant retention, and asset-level performance




A dedicated property manager at Workspace would create a more commercially focused and scalable operating model

Reduce Costs at the Corporate Level

Workspace's headcount has grown over time creating operating leverage/fixed costs that are outpacing earnings¹

Net Rental Income/Employee (£k)



An outsourced property manager could reduce costs and provide greater flexibility as properties are sold

Inconsistent Returns on Capital in Recent Refurbishments

£165m of incremental investment generated only an estimated £31.8m in recoverable value

Significant Capital Deployed

£165m invested across 15 assets in refurbishment projects completed between 2016-2022²


Minimal Rent Uplift

Annualized net rent roll impact across sites is inconsistent (~£2.5M improvement in aggregate), including 5 where the net change was negative

Refurbishments Yet to Deliver ROI

Six years after completion of the refurbishment program, rent roll remains broadly unchanged vs. pre-investment levels

2020 vs. 2026 NRR Change & Invested CapEx (£m)³



Workspace's Unrealistic Expectations for Returns on CapEx

Workspace's illustrations rely on unrealistic assumptions around yield on cost that are ~8x what the Company has historically achieved

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DETAILED COMPARISON OF ANALYSIS FOR AN ILLUSTRATIVE £200M DISPOSAL AT A 22% DISCOUNT TO BOOK

£m, unless stated otherwise	A Share buyback	B CAPEX
NRI lost on £200m of asset disposals	(11)	(11)
Net interest savings on £72m of debt payback	4	4
Additional net rental income	-	9
Earnings adjustments	(7)	2
Beginning diluted NOSH (m)	193	193
Shares repurchased (m)	(22)	-
Ending diluted NOSH (m)	171	193
Beginning earnings	61	61
Ending earnings	53	62
Beginning EPS (p)	31.3	31.3
Ending EPS (p)	31.3	39.2
EPS accretion (%)	(0.1%)	2.9%

Saba's proposal has failed to factor in the earnings profile of any investment / capital return and subsequently the value generated for shareholders

Source: Information as of 31st March 2026.
Notes: Assumptions as part of the analysis include: LTV remains constant on disposal in share buyback case; finance costs of 5%.

- Based on the prior slide, Workspace's historical refurbishment and CapEx have returned 1.5% yield on cost, not 12%
- This indicates additional annual net rental income of £1.1m rather than £9m¹
- When using historical figures grounded in reality, Workspace's proposal is clearly inferior

Workspace Historical Refurbishment CapEx and Returns (from prior slide)

CapEx Invested (2016-22)	£165m ¹
Net Rental Change (2020-26)	£2.5m ¹
Yield on Cost	1.5%

Revising Workspace's Est. Refurbishment CapEx and Returns

Workspace Estimated CapEx	£73m
Yield on Cost	1.5%
Additional Net Rental Income	£1.1m
EPS Accretion	-9%

There is no basis for Workspace's dramatically higher estimated returns on refurbishment CapEx

Transformation Underway

Workspace in its full year results for FY26 touted its transformation to an “earnings-focused business”

What are they transforming from? What has the Board been doing this whole time?



- By Workspace’s own admission, the Board has been focused on something other than earnings and shareholder returns
- We commend the sense of urgency from CEO Charlie Green and CFO Tom Moss-Edwards. However, this transformation is too little, too late, and too risky
- Workspace’s current strategy is yielding an expected earnings compression in FY27 and represents uncertain potential value creation
- This strategy does not represent the bold and decisive action needed to close the discount to NAV and create value for all shareholders
- Workspace investors deserve a Board that understands its focus should always be on earnings and value creation, not just when investors are disgruntled

Non-Executive Directors Have Limited Skin in the Game

Non-executive director ownership indicates weak alignment with shareholders, particularly compared to Saba

Non-Executive Director	Director Since	Shares Held	Market Value
David Stevenson	2024	3,934	£13,501
Manju Malhotra	2022	2,724	£9,349
Nick Mackenzie	2022	16,900	£58,001
Duncan Owen	2021	20,010	£68,674
Lesley-Ann Nash	2021	0	£0
Rosie Shapland	2020	9,000	£30,888
Total		52,568	£180,413

0.03%

Non-Executive Directors'
Holdings in Workspace¹


c. 27.1%

Saba Capital
Holdings in Workspace²

52.2 million shares

Non-Executive Director Remuneration Has Risen While Shareholders Have Lost

Workspace's TSR declined 31% while non-executive director remuneration increased 58%



Lack of Industry Experience Among Non-Executive Directors

Non-executive directors lack requisite real estate experience to oversee management

Director	Director Since	Relevant Real Estate Expertise	Primary Expertise
David Stevenson	2024	✗	Media and editorial; columnist for the <i>FT</i>
Manju Malhotra	2022	✗	Retail; luxury department stores
Nick Mackenzie	2022	✗	Restaurants; theme parks
Duncan Owen <i>Chairman</i>	2021	✓	Real estate
Lesley-Ann Nash	2021	✗	Finance; formerly Morgan Stanley
Rosie Shapland <i>Senior Independent Director</i>	2020	✗	Audit; formerly PwC


Duncan Owen is the only non-executive director with primary real estate expertise. He is also the chairman of Link REIT, one of the largest REITs in Asia (and substantially larger than Workspace). Link is headquartered in Hong Kong, where Owen reportedly spends significant time in-person. He is also a director of multiple other private companies and organisations.

Shareholders should be concerned that Owen may be distracted and unavailable for Workspace-related business. Regardless of whether he is overcommitted, he has overseen the discount to NAV deepen and value destruction over his tenure.

Non-Executive Directors Have Overseen Value Destruction


Workspace's TSR has been negative and underperformed the UK Office REITs Subgroup by a wide margin over the tenure of every non-executive director¹

Workspace Absolute and Relative TSR Over Non-Executive Director Tenure



Succession Planning Failure Highlights Governance Weaknesses


Succession planning failure underscores the need to refresh a disengaged and underqualified Board



Sudden departure of Hutchings with no transition period after just 14 months in the CEO role suggests non-executive directors are acting reflexively and lack the composure of a qualified Board

Failed Audit Committee Oversight of CRM System Update

CRM system update incurred massive cost overruns while like-for-like (LFL) occupancy declined



CRM replacement project represents a major failure by the Audit Committee:

- ✗ Project cost exceeds 5x original estimate
- ✗ The expected cost is up from £3m to almost £11m since the Audit Committee assumed responsibility
- ✗ Several delays with completion now pushed to FY27 and potential for further increased costs
- ✗ Despite high levels of investment, occupancy has still underperformed
- ✗ Invested capital would have been better used to fund buybacks or dividends

Non-Executive Director Nominees with Strong, Relevant Industry Expertise

Saba is nominating six new non-executive directors to join the Workspace Board and replace the non-executive incumbents



Greg Attwood

- Founder and Managing Director of Heathfield Partners
- 33+ years experience in real estate development and construction; focus on turnaround and recovery of distressed development projects



Gautam Garg

- Led investments at Elliott, ExodusPoint, Lazard, LMR and Verition
- 20+ years in global REITs; extensive experience driving shareholder value with boards and management through asset divestitures and capital allocation



Simon Hampton

- Chair of Alantra's UK Real Assets advisory business and former head of PwC's UK Real Estate Deals practice
- 35+ years experience advising REITs on capital raising, M&A, restructuring, and strategic transactions



Nick Shattock

- Former Deputy Chief Executive and Director of Quintain Estates & Development plc
- 30+ years experience overseeing large-scale UK real estate development and regeneration



Andrew Sim

- Founder and CEO of Mosaic Capital LLP; former Head of Global Capital Markets for Knight Frank LLP and Managing Director of Europe
- 30+ years experience in global real estate capital markets



Richard Starr

- Chartered surveyor and former Executive Property Director of Palace Capital plc
- 25+ years of real estate experience with expertise in capital allocation, portfolio strategy and asset repositioning

Non-Executive Director Nominees' Relevant Skills and Expertise

Saba's nominees have deep experience and expertise in the fields that are relevant to Workspace and its turnaround



	Greg Attwood	Gautam Garg	Simon Hampton	Nick Shattock	Andrew Sim	Richard Starr
Real Estate Transactions	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Real Estate Valuation	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Property Management	✓			✓	✓	✓
Development & Construction	✓			✓	✓	✓
Capital Markets	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Finance	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Executive Leadership	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Operations	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Saba's Director Nominees Are Truly Independent

Saba's nominees are not Saba employees and have no prior relationship with the firm

NON-EXECUTIVE MAJORITY WHILE HOLDING A 0.27%
INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT AND THE BOARD'S SKILLS MIX

Saba | Capital 

Workspace Presentation
1 Jul. 2026

Saba's proposed Board would weaken independent and skilled oversight of Workspace, increasing operational risk and potentially placing the Company in breach of the UK Corporate Governance Code

- ? Shareholders should carefully evaluate whether Saba's nominees:
 - ? ...provide the requisite comprehensive experience and high performance on publicly listed Boards
 - ? ...have clear operational expertise at large enterprises or REITs
 - ? ...have the ability and commitment to oversee the operations of Workspace as a going concern, given Saba's strategic proposals
- ? Experience appears to be skewed towards Saba's asset disposals thesis, which we believe is not suitable for Workspace
- ? No Saba nominee is equipped with audit expertise, in clear breach of the UK Corporate Governance Code
- ? All-male Board resulting in a lack of gender diversity (40% target under FCA rules)
- ? Nominees are suggested by Saba, Board may lack independence under UK corporate governance standards
- ? "Development and Construction" skills are not required to oversee Workspace operations

- There is zero basis for questioning all nominees' independence. There is no conflict with UK corporate governance standards
- Saba's nominees are far more independent than the existing directors who are clearly entrenched and defensive
- Saba's nominees have the expertise to oversee Workspace's operations and the execution of an effective asset disposal program
- In contrast, the incumbent Board has overseen persistent value destruction
- Nominees are open to ongoing Board refreshment to potentially enhance gender diversity

Workspace's critique of Saba's nominees is baseless.
Saba's nominees possess far greater depth of experience than incumbent NEDs

Greg Attwood



EXPERIENCE

Founder and Managing Director of Heathfield Partners, a special situations development management consultancy.

33+ years experience in real estate development, construction, finance and restructuring across the U.K., SE Asia, USA and Middle East.

Previously worked at **PwC Business Recovery Services – Real Estate** (2008–2013), turning around distressed development projects.

15 years in consulting structural engineering, including 10 years at Arup, before pivoting to real estate finance following an MBA at Imperial College.

HIGHLIGHTS & TRACK RECORD

- CEO, advisor and turnaround appointments for **Land Securities, Allied London, Daiwa Capital Markets, Teneo, Ingenious Group, Lloyd's Development Capital, Royal Bank of Scotland and Lamington Group**
- Specialist in **distressed-development turnaround and recovery** across **mixed-use, residential, hotel, office** and regeneration schemes for institutional and private equity investors, lenders and developers
- **CEO at Northfleet Harbourside, a £2bn development** of 3,500 homes, an 8,000-seat football stadium/concert venue, 850,000 sq. ft. of office and retail space and 300 room hotel

Representative
Experience

heathfield



ARUP

Gautam Garg



Saba's Chairman-
Designate

EXPERIENCE

Chief Investment Officer of Aymer AI, a full stack investor in the artificial intelligence data centre ecosystem.

Two decades leading multibillion-dollar investments in global REITs, real assets and technology infrastructure companies at **Elliott, ExodusPoint, Lazard, LMR and Verition**.

Deep experience **engaging executive leadership teams** on strategic partnerships, board refreshment, asset divestitures and capital allocation.

HIGHLIGHTS & TRACK RECORD

- **Co-led & co-managed the Lazard Global Real Estate and U.S. REIT funds** through a period of sector beating outperformance and growth in institutional assets under management. Founding member of the Lazard Global Real Assets Fund.
- **“Active” investor in WeWork** during its \$9bn public markets debut. Tabled proposal to become a “control” investor (during its \$18bn bankruptcy) recommending asset divestitures, lease restructurings and pivoting to a global franchisor model.

Representative
Experience

ELLIOTT

LAZARD

EXODUSPOINT®

Simon Hampton



EXPERIENCE

Non-Executive Chair and Senior Advisor to **Alantra's UK Real Assets Investment Banking business.**

35+ years of corporate finance experience advising REITs, public companies, institutional investors and real estate businesses.

Former **head of PwC's UK Real Estate Deals practice**; 11-year PwC Partner who led UK Corporate Finance and established the Real Assets practice.

Earlier c.24 years at **Jefferies, Bank of America/Merrill Lynch** and **NatWest Markets**; FCA-Approved Person 20+ years.

HIGHLIGHTS & TRACK RECORD

- Lead advisor to **The Mansion Group Holdings ("TMGH")** on its £500m+ JV PBSA platform with ActivumSG; and to **Student Homes Management** on their JV student HMO platform with Brookfield.
- Lead advisor to **Lloyds Development Capital ("LDC")** on its sale of **Aquavista Marinas** to Antin Infrastructure.
- Lead advisor to **Bourne Leisure** on its sale of Haven, Butlin's and Warner Leisure Hotels to Blackstone.
- Advisor to **Blackstone** on its successful UK Public Offer for **Japan Residential Investment Company plc ("JRIC")** and their US\$26bn acquisition of **Hilton Hotels Corporation.**
- Sole Advisor to **British Land plc** on its £230m outsourcing of **Pillar Retail Europark Fund ("PREF")** and Asset Sales.
- Sole bookrunner to **Tritax Big Box plc** on its £200m IPO; Lead advisor to **Aermont Capital** on their successful UK Public Offer for **Pinewood Studios plc.**

Representative
Experience

ALANTRA



Jefferies



Nick Shattock



EXPERIENCE

30+ years in UK real estate; **16-year Main Board Director and former Deputy CEO of Quintain Estates & Development PLC** (FTSE 250); Finance Director on flotation.

Currently NED of **Ebbsfleet Development Corporation** (15,000-home Garden City) and NED of **Marshall of Cambridge** – the defence contractor and owner of Cambridge Airport.

Former real estate partner at SJ Berwin.

Former NED of the MOD's Defence Infrastructure Organisation, with construction turnover ranging from £3.5bn to £6bn.

HIGHLIGHTS & TRACK RECORD

- Led acquisition, planning and development of **two of London's four largest regenerations** – Wembley Park (Lord Rogers master plan, 8.5m sq. ft. + 6,000+ homes) and Greenwich Peninsula (Sir Terry Farrell, 14.3m sq. ft. + 10,000 homes).
- Development and investment experience in all real estate sectors, West End, City of London, Docklands, Greater London and the regions
- Participated in **3 PLC takeovers** with post-acquisition rationalisation – Chesterfield Properties PLC, English & Overseas Properties PLC and Fiscal Properties (£1bn+).
- Operational experience in hotels, live entertainment, conferences/exhibitions, serviced offices, student, BTR, nursing homes.

Representative
Experience



Andrew Sim



EXPERIENCE

Founder and CEO of **Mosaic Capital LLP** (European real estate private equity).

30+ years of transactional experience across international real estate capital markets.

Former Managing Director of Knight Frank's European business, a multi-sector platform spanning 19 countries with over 2,000 people; member of the Group Executive Board.

Former **Chair of Knight Frank's Global Capital Markets and Capital Advisory** (FCA-regulated) businesses; previously CBRE West End Capital Markets.

HIGHLIGHTS & TRACK RECORD

- **Founded the Knight Frank European Investment Team** in 1999; built it into one of the top-3 cross-border teams, with transactional experience from Portugal to Poland, Norway to Greece and everywhere in between.
- **Navigated Knight Frank Europe through Brexit and Covid to record turnover and profit results**; tripled profits in France and restructured loss-making businesses in Spain and Germany; corporate acquisition of a Pan-Nordic business.
- **Relevant advisory**: Kanam's £1bn Lion Portfolio in Central London; Tritax Eurobox (REIT) €1bn Pan European logistics; M15 Curzon Street development sale; Ministry of Defence development consultancy; Gulf Finance House (first UK Sharia compliant fund).
- Harvard Executive MBA; fluent in French and Italian.

Representative
Experience



Richard Starr



EXPERIENCE

Chartered Surveyor (MRICS, 2002) with 25+ years experience in UK real estate, including board-level responsibility at plc level.

Extensive listed REIT, capital allocation and asset repositioning expertise.

Former **Executive Property Director of Palace Capital plc** (2013–2022), reporting to the CEO with board-level responsibility for portfolio strategy and capital allocation.

Founder of **Acorn2Oak Property** (2022–present); NED of BioZen Limited; previously CEO Mentor, Westway Trust.

HIGHLIGHTS & TRACK RECORD

- Helped scale **Palace Capital from £2m to £260m**, including the transition to a REIT and Premium Listing on the main market.
- Led a **post-Covid strategic portfolio review** – secured Board approval for a disposal and reinvestment programme targeting the bottom 20% of the portfolio, repositioning towards higher-quality assets.
- Drove the pivot from organic growth to inorganic acquisition – identified a target requiring an equity raise of half the company's net worth and the resulting main-market listing.

Representative
Experience



Vote for Saba Capital's Nominees

Visit <http://makeworkspacework.co.uk> to learn more.